



International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency

Operational Note on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Programming

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Summary: *This document provides guidance on strategic issues that arise in the conceptualization, development, endorsement, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) programmes. It is intended to assist Chiefs of Mission, Project and Programme Managers, Regional Technical Specialists, and project developers, and establishes the institutional parameters for working on PVE-specific programming, designed to achieve PVE specific outcomes, and PVE-relevant programming, that pursues different objectives, but which are expected to impact on PVE aims. The Note builds off the DG Memo of August 2015, convening an IOM Task Force on Counter-Terrorism / Countering Violent Extremism (CT/CVE), and the ODG communication of August 18, 2015 conferring oversight and endorsement for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) activities with DOE/TRD, and counter-terrorism related border security activities with DMM/IBM. It draws from the findings and outcomes of two IOM Symposiums on PVE held in Nairobi in 2016 and Geneva in 2018, and represents a further step toward institutional coherence and coordination. This Note will be reviewed in four months, in June 2020, as it will act as a working document, receptive and responsive to needs and ongoing discussions on PVE.*

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I. Introduction

1. The field of preventing violent extremism (PVE) has grown in recent years with expanded roles among international peace and development actors, locally-led initiatives and networks in some 100 countries¹ and high levels of donor funding.² The trend reflects the consensus that security-focused operations alone cannot defeat violent extremism and that the phenomenon continues to pose a serious global threat.
2. IOM recognizes that violent extremism, which feeds off and aggravates armed conflict, is a significant factor in displacement and human suffering. In line with IOM's global commitment to tackle the root causes of displacement, the Organization has identified the importance of contextualized, preventive action and has been called on by Member States to contribute to PVE efforts.
3. In 2015, IOM's Director General convened an internal task force to consolidate practice and knowledge management around IOM activities that linked to counter-terrorism (CT) or PVE. He emphasized the need for cautious deliberation in all aspects of this programming as well as to anchor CT and PVE efforts in the Organization's established areas of work, such as border management, stabilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Further, the Department of Migration Management (DMM) produced an internal guidance note³ on border security and management programming for counter-terrorism, while the Department of Operations and Emergencies (DOE) developed training materials and made PVE resources available on the DOE portal. In Nairobi in 2016 and in Geneva in 2018, IOM headquarters brought missions together to share experiences and perspectives as well as contribute to institution-wide decisions on PVE.
4. Drawing from the presentations and discussions in Nairobi and Geneva, this guidance represents a further step toward institutional coherence and coordination. The Note aims to advise senior managers, regional technical specialists and project developers on strategic issues that arise in the conceptualization, development and launch of PVE programmes, while recognizing vast contextual diversity in the portfolio. The Note covers *PVE-specific* programming that is designed to achieve PVE goals and *PVE-relevant* programming that pursues different objectives but is expected to impact on PVE aims.

¹ The figure represents the total number of countries in which different actors are engaged in PVE activities, not just the programmes of IOM country missions.

² Eric Rosand, Emily Winterbotham, Michael Jones and Franziska Praxl-Tabuchi, "A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda," (The Prevention Project and Royal United Services Institute, 2018): 16.

³ This Note covers different ground from the DMM guidance note, which dealt specifically with border management interventions for counter-terrorism. As clarified in the next section, PVE activities target potentially vulnerable individuals and communities rather than active terrorists or violent extremists.



II. Context

Key definitions and issues around terminology

5. *Noting that there are no generally accepted definitions for core terms needed to discuss violent extremism, the following “working definitions” are proposed as a shared lexicon to facilitate internal dialogue and coherence.* Both extremism and radicalism are problematic concepts. They are broad, subjective and susceptible to political manipulation, including for suppression of non-violent political processes.⁴ The association of both terms with the Muslim faith means that their usage can reinforce discrimination, and labelling a person or community as being vulnerable to violent extremism or radicalization risks stigmatizing them.⁵ IOM must use these terms cautiously, make efforts to disassociate violent phenomena from any religion or ethnicity, and avoid terminology that explicitly links them, such as “jihadist violence” or “Islamic terrorism.”
6. **Violent extremism** involves advocating, committing or supporting acts of violence to achieve ideological objectives that are typically based on racial, religious or ethnic supremacy or opposition to democratic principles. The term refers to the ideology and the means used, such that an individual or group can be violent extremist in goals, methods or both.⁶ Violent extremism and terrorism are distinct concepts. Violent extremist acts are not always terrorist acts and terrorism that is not motivated by notions of supremacy or opposition to core democratic values is not generally considered to be violent extremism.
7. **Preventing violent extremism** refers to non-coercive measures to address the drivers of violent extremism, create resilience among potentially vulnerable populations and prevent recruitment or mobilization to extremist violence.

Unlike counter-terrorism (CT), PVE relies on non-coercive action and partnerships with community actors, mainly outside the security sector. The term is preferable to “countering violent extremism” because PVE precludes any notion of confronting or targeting the messages, methods or organizations of active violent extremists.

8. The sensitivities around violent extremism transfer to PVE, and classifying IOM’s work as such carries risks. For example, key stakeholders may reject programming they see as instrumentalizing

⁴ OSCE, “Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework,” (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2018): 54.

⁵⁵ Alliance for Peacebuilding, “Peacebuilding Approaches to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism,” (Washington DC: 2018): 5.

⁶ Peter Neumann, “Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and De-radicalization in 15 countries,” (London: ICSR, 2012); Alex Schmid, “Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” (The Hague: ICCT, 2014).



them for security gains or alternately, key stakeholders may use the violent extremist label for political purposes. During preparatory research and consultations, IOM should tailor terminology to the local discourse and language, possibly opting to reframe its intervention as “violence prevention,” “resilience to extremism”, “community engagement,” or “social cohesion.”⁷

9. **Violent radicalization** is a process whereby an individual or group adopts extremist beliefs that condone the use of violence to achieve political aims. Referring to violent radicalization (rather than radicalization alone) averts some of the problems mentioned above by stressing that views on violence, not unpopular or unusual beliefs, is the cause of concern.
10. **Deradicalization and disengagement**⁸ refer to processes occurring after a person or group has engaged in violent extremism. *Deradicalization* is a process of cognitive change in which a group or individual relinquishes beliefs or attitudes that justify the use of violence to achieve political aims. In the context of some IOM programming addressing the reintegration of former fighters associated with VE groups (e.g. Boko Haram) the term *Disassociation* is used to describe the process of deradicalization as they disassociate themselves from these groups and their ideologies and are disassociated in the eyes of the community. *Disengagement* involves a behavioural change whereby a group or individual ceases participation in violent extremist activities, which is not necessarily accompanied by a shift in ideology.

Together with reintegration of former fighters, these processes are relevant to PVE insofar as they aim to prevent recidivism and community flare-ups around reinsertion or to leverage the unique potential of those who have renounced violent extremism to dissuade others from taking it up.

11. **PVE-specific and PVE-relevant programming** are defined so as to clarify how IOM’s project and activities act on PVE goals. *PVE-specific programming* is designed pursuant to a theory of change supported by evidence to address the drivers of violent extremism, create resilience among potentially vulnerable populations and prevent recruitment or mobilization to extremist violence. *PVE-relevant programming* refers to activities that do not meet the definition of PVE-specific programming but that nonetheless are expected to contribute to PVE aims.

III. International framework

12. The United Nations’ (UN) growing role in this field is reflected in its institutional architecture and Security Council resolutions on point. At the agency level, the UN Office on Counter-Terrorism

⁷ Eric Rosand *et al*, “A Roadmap,” 26.

⁸ Naureen Chowdury Fink and Ellie Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism,” (International Peace Institute, 2008): 3; Tobias Metzger, “Caught between ‘Deradicalization’ and ‘Disengagement’: Clarifying Terms in the Discourse of Terrorism,” *Inquiries Journal*, 5, no. 11 (2013)



(UNOCT), established in 2017 to provide strategic leadership to the UN's CT efforts, oversees both the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). IOM is an observer to the CTITF, together with the UN High Commission for Refugees and several other UN agencies. At the membership level, the UN Security Council set up a Counter-Terrorism Council (CTC) to bolster abilities among Member States to prevent terrorism, as well as an Executive Directorate (CTED) to support the Council and facilitate technical assistance. IOM participates in expert assessment visits coordinated by the CTED to identify the capacities and assistance needs of Member States. UN Security Council Resolution 2129 (2013) called on the CTC and the CTED to focus on prevention and increase activities to confront violent extremism.

13. In 2015, The UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism stresses the need for collective efforts to systematically address the drivers of violent extremism. The Plan recommends that each Member State develop a national action plan around seven priorities: *dialogue and conflict prevention; strengthening good governance; human rights and the rule of law; engaging communities; empowering youth; gender equality and empowering women; education, skills development and employment facilitation; and strategic communications*.⁹ In his accompanying letter to the General Assembly, the Secretary General committed to implementing an “All-of-United Nations” approach at headquarters and in the field, echoing his recommendation to Member States to adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society modalities in their national action plans.¹⁰
14. The UN Security Council has underscored the importance of PVE in a series of resolutions that are relevant to IOM's approach, including: Resolution 2178 (2014) calling on states to develop strategies to address conditions that are conducive to the spread of violent extremism; Resolution 2242 (2015) linking the Women, Peace and Security agenda to PVE efforts; and Resolution 2250 (2015) urging Member States to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making within institutions and mechanisms, including those to counter violent extremism.
15. According to the UN Plan, PVE is a commitment and an obligation under the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Efforts to address violent extremism must comply with international human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law (IHL). Particularly, PVE action should be examined with reference to Articles 18 and 19 of both

⁹ UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 2015 (A/70/674).

¹⁰ Letter dated 22 December 2015 from the Secretary General to the President of the General Assembly (A/70/675).



the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, enshrining the rights to freedom of thought, religion, and expression.¹¹

IV. Migration issues

16. The relationship between migration and violent extremism is a common subject of heated debate and rhetoric based on unfounded assumptions. Some of the potential intersections between migration and violent extremism are outlined here as a prompt to future research.

Conflict, displacement and violent extremism

17. Conflict is a core driver of both displacement and violent extremism in many contexts. The majority of terrorist attacks occur in conflict-affected countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The UN Plan on PVE explains that “prolonged and unresolved conflicts”¹² are conducive to violent extremism on two grounds: conflict negatively impacts on people and governance, and violent extremists feed-off conflict-aggravated grievances.

18. The UN Plan also regards violent extremism as a significant contributing factor to the soaring rates of internal displacement in recent years. Violent extremism, coupled with state-led military responses, is a direct cause of displacement in some cases, but also acts as an indirect driver by complicating and prolonging armed conflicts, impeding sustainable development and disrupting humanitarian aid to populations in need.

Migration, recruitment and xenophobia

19. There are concerns that certain circumstances that may accompany migration, and especially forced migration, can exacerbate risks of recruitment or mobilization to violent extremism. More research is needed to understand whether, when and how such risks materialize. It is important to note from the outset that the percentage of migrants who turn to violent extremism is very small and that even where risk analysis may suggest mitigating measures for some migrant groups, it is always misleading to refer to migrants as “prone” or “susceptible” to terrorism or violent extremism.¹³

20. The UN Plan on PVE highlighted a first intersection between displacement and forced recruitment by stating that “IDPs and refugees, particularly children, are at an increased risk of forced

¹¹ Human Rights Council Report on Best Practices and Lessons Learned on How Protecting and Promoting Human Rights Contribute to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016 (A/HRC/33/29): 4.

¹² UN Plan, 8

¹³ Peter Neumann, “Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations and Good Practices from the OSCE Region,” (OSCE, 2017): 25-26.



recruitment, including by violent extremist groups.”¹⁴ The related phenomenon of violent radicalization in camps was explored in the chapter on violent extremism and migration in IOM’s 2018 World Migration Report: the authors referred to examples from Pakistan, Yemen, Cameroon and Jordan where residents adopted violent extremist beliefs in the camps.¹⁵

21. Another concern involves the numerically-small number of migrants and their descendants who mobilize to violence after they are settled. While the data are “scattered and unsystematic,”¹⁶ there is some evidence that when migrants are not fully integrated into their new communities and face marginalization, exclusion or problems around identity, these factors may aggravate risks for recruitment. A final issue relates to xenophobia contributing to violent attacks on migrants, which should be classified as violent extremism when these are motivated by ideas of racial, ethnic, religious or national supremacy.

Human trafficking and violent extremism

22. In Resolution 2331 (2016), the UN Security Council recognized that human trafficking can be used as a tactic by terrorist groups to incentivize recruitment, generate revenues, displace populations from desired territories and control communities. The Security Council condemned human trafficking for purposes of sexual slavery, exploitation or forced labour by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
23. The UN’s definition of trafficking in persons includes recruitment by means of *inter alia* force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or deception.¹⁷ The recruitment and use of children by parties to armed conflict is associated with trafficking because children cannot meaningfully consent to recruitment. The recruitment of an adult may be understood as trafficking only where the recruitment is carried out by the means set out in the UN’s definition. On the contrary, where an individual intends to join a group and exercises personal agency to achieve that intent, their recruitment would not normally be characterized as trafficking.

IOM mandate and commitments

24. IOM’s commitment to informing dialogue around migration issues is reflected in its Constitution, 12-point strategy and Principle 2 of the Migration Governance Framework (MIGOF). It is mirrored in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which connects evidence-

¹⁴ UN Plan, 6.

¹⁵ Khalid Koser and Amy Cunningham, “Migration, Violent Extremism and Social Exclusion,” in IOM World Migration Report (2018) (Geneva: IOM, 2017): 5-6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁷ Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.



based public discourse to the goal of eliminating racism, xenophobia and stigmatization against migrants.

25. The Organization's efforts to prevent conflict and violent extremism are grounded in its commitment to prevent, mitigate and respond to root causes and drivers of forced displacement at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, as well as in the Migration Crises Operational Framework (MCOF) and the Organization's Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement. In confronting structural drivers of violent extremism and forced migration, IOM acts pursuant to the GCM's objective to minimize adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, including its affirmation that migration should be a choice, not a necessity.
26. IOM affirmed the centrality of protection in its humanitarian operations in its Principles for Humanitarian Action and its internal guidance on protection. IOM's framework on displacement identified the immediate and long-term protection needs of displaced populations, including the possibility they will face discrimination, exploitation and extreme deprivation that may result in an increased risk of recruitment by armed groups.
27. IOM understands integration as a two-way process of adaptation among migrants and receiving societies. Integration encompasses both *inclusion*, meaning incorporation into the social, economic and political life of the receiving community, and *social cohesion*, requiring mutual understanding in the absence of xenophobia and anti-discrimination. The Organization's determined engagement on migrant integration is supported by its Constitution, 12-point strategy and longstanding global practice. In the New York Declaration, the UN and Member States agreed to improve integration, combat xenophobia, and reduce the risks of marginalization and radicalization.
28. Finally, noting that violent extremist groups are responsible for human trafficking on a large scale, IOM's preventative action also aligns with the Organization's sustained engagement to combat trafficking globally and its current efforts to prevent trafficking in crises contexts, anchored in IOM's 12-point strategy and MIGOF's Objective 2 on the mobility dimensions of crises.

V. Parameters for engagement

IOM approach

29. IOM recognizes that violent extremism is a serious and continuing threat to peace, security and human rights, as well as a significant factor in forced displacement and an obstacle to sustainable development. The Organization's engagement on PVE contributes to ongoing efforts to address root causes of irregular migration and displacement as well as advancing the rights and wellbeing



of migrants. It is shaped by the belief that principled preventive action is indispensable to ending violent extremism.

30. IOM's approach targets contextualized drivers of recruitment and fosters community resilience. Its PVE projects are based on robust evidence and stress the importance of human rights, conflict sensitivity, gender equality and partnership. IOM recognizes that local governmental, civil society and community actors are critical to successful prevention and peacebuilding, and works to strengthen their capacities and leadership.

Related programming

31. PVE is not in itself a new form of programming. Rather, as the UN Plan suggests, it is a new manifestation or expression of existing social, political and economic challenges. IOM's experience and field-tested methods in community stabilization, migrant integration, social cohesion, institutional strengthening, ex-combatant reintegration, research and communications are relevant to PVE. This is not to say that ongoing programming should be "rebranded"¹⁸ as PVE, but that IOM's institutional strengths are building blocks for its efforts to address local conditions that are conducive to violent extremism.
32. IOM's stabilization approach, for example, aims to prevent, mitigate and reduce the drivers and negative effects of irregular migration and displacement. Stabilization activities may aim to expand access to essential services, rehabilitate basic infrastructure and spur economic recovery. By also strengthening local institutions, relationships and communal cohesion, the stabilization approach effectively closes the space – opened up by conflict and crises – in which violent extremist narratives and recruitment could otherwise thrive.
33. Similarly, IOM's longstanding support to Member States to foster migrant integration provides a solid programmatic foundation for PVE efforts to reinforce resilience among migrant communities and prevent xenophobic, discriminatory acts against them.

Current PVE portfolio

34. Between 2015-2019, IOM has implemented 45 PVE-specific and relevant projects in 22 countries within the IOM regions of Central and West Africa; East Africa; Middle East and Northern Africa; the European Economic Area; and South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Some recurring themes in these projects are summarized here.
 - **Community-based approaches**, involving stabilization programming and efforts to enable community actors to play stronger prevention roles

¹⁸ See James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation," (Royal United Services Institute, 2016): 3.



- **Support to at-risk individuals**, often marginalized youths, women or former combatants, with a focus on livelihoods, education, increased participation, inclusion, and social cohesion.
- **Research**, typically into the localized drivers of violent extremism, occurring at the inception of the project or as continuous situational analysis throughout implementation
- **Government capacity building**, at national and subnational levels with emphasis on interinstitutional coordination and training, including in some cases support to security and law enforcement sectors
- **Information programming**, ranging from the promotion of alternative narratives to interventions designed to increase competencies among potential recipients of extremist propaganda to interpret media critically
- **Psychosocial support services**, including activities to strengthen resilience and problem-solving in at-risk populations

Principled action

Primacy of human rights

35. IOM's determination to promote human rights approaches in all policies, strategies, projects and activities is expressed in its mandatory guidance on protection, and adherence to international standards is the first principle set out in IOM's MIGOF. In the PVE context, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has cautioned that PVE contains tangible risks for human rights.¹⁹ IOM must act to avert these risks, including by refraining from action that threatens to infringe on freedoms of association, expression, thought or religion and by seeking to prevent the association of violent extremism with any religion, culture, ethnicity or race.

Understanding context

36. IOM recognizes that structural, individual and enabling factors²⁰ that motivate and enable violent extremism are highly dependent on context, as are their relative significance and the interactions between them. Context is relevant also to the identification of viable interventions and their probability of success. It follows that PVE responses are unlikely to succeed without a clear and objective assessment of contextual drivers, necessitating new research in most cases. Furthermore, crisis environments and violent extremist recruitment are fast-changing and call for continuous reassessment.

¹⁹ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 2016 (A/HRC/3/65).

²⁰ Khalil and Zeuthen, "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction," 10-11.



Conflict sensitivity

37. PVE work will often bring IOM into communities characterised by conflict, grievances and social friction, where conflict sensitivity is most acutely needed. PVE programmes must exhibit caution to avoid stigmatizing beneficiaries or harming local leaders and other participants as a result of their association with project activities. Recognizing that PVE is a politically-charged field, IOM should seek to understand the political strategies and motivations of its partners and ensure that IOM's efforts do not inadvertently lend support or "cover" to potentially harmful activities. Further, to the extent that IOM's responses to violent extremism aim for transformational change, for example by empowering women, conflict sensitivity requires IOM to anticipate the potentially negative repercussions.

Gender

38. Women's empowerment and gender mainstreaming are crucial to the PVE agenda. The UN Security Council has recognized that women can be effective allies in preventive efforts, and there is growing evidence that respect for women's rights correlates with resilience to violent extremism.²¹ That said, in considering PVE through a gendered lens, it is important to avoid stereotypes about women's attitudes and behaviour with respect to violence. Women sometimes eschew violence and act as peacebuilders, and sometimes encourage or perpetrate violence and replicate patterns of discrimination and exclusion. In line with conflict sensitivity and human rights approaches, efforts to promote women's positive roles in prevention should be pursued with caution to avoid harming women, including by "securitizing" their rights and interests. From another angle, gender norms, such as an expectation that men be sole providers for their families or that young men achieve economic autonomy before marrying, may increase male susceptibility to recruitment.²²

Partnership

39. In engaging with partners, the highly political and sensitive nature of PVE may also call on IOM to retain a degree of autonomy from partners (and donors) to shape programming and terminology in line with these core principles. This may necessitate diversifying a donor base for programming or calibrating IOM's engagement with counter-terrorism actors within the UN system and donor community. It is clear nonetheless that PVE requires joined-up or at least harmonious action among international, national and subnational actors to achieve holistic responses. Within the UN, IOM can solidify partnerships with UN agencies active in this field, work towards complementary approaches and common terminology, and contribute to the whole-of-UN approach set out by the previous Secretary General, while guarding IOM's posture towards this sensitive area of work.

²¹ UN Women, "Global Study on Resolution 1325," (UN Women, 2015), 222, 228.

²² See, e.g., Luisa Dietrich and Simone Carter, "Gender and Conflict Analysis in ISIS Affected Communities of Iraq," (Oxfam, 2017).



Engaging national and subnational governments is necessary to foster their leadership and accountability and to secure structural gains that impact on PVE, for example in the areas of governance, human rights and delivery of basic services.,

Local leadership

40. In general, PVE initiatives that offer local actors a meaningful role to design interventions and deliver community services will be more effective. This is partly because local actors are uniquely positioned to navigate the complexities of PVE, and partly because their engagement can generate independent effects on local governance and resilience. In its PVE programming, IOM should prioritize accountability to affected populations and community-led implementation as well as explore ways to involve local implementers, including through small-grants programmes. IOM may provide training and guidance to build capacities among partners to address identified gaps in project management, financial administration, fundraising, reporting and conflict sensitivity, among others.

Risk assessment and management

41. IOM understands risk within the project cycle as “the effect of uncertainty on the project objectives” and considers three types of risk: (1) those linked to the internal environment, which are largely within IOM’s influence, (2) those linked to the external environment, which are largely outside IOM’s influence, and (3) those linked to the interface between one or more organizations, or between internal and external environments. Through a PVE lens, analysis of the effects of uncertainty on project objectives must be supplemented with an evaluation of external and “interfaced” risks on IOM missions, staff, beneficiaries and other participants.

Project risk

42. The complexities involved in determining causal factors for violent extremism, environmental instability where most PVE takes place, and the scarcity of evidence on “what works,” taken together, contribute to uncertainty that a project will reach its objectives. IOM can enhance prospects for success through serious research and consultations prior to launching the project, by ensuring that the project has adequate funds, time and staff, and the flexibility to adapt to dynamic circumstances. IOM should put in place dynamic M&E systems which offer continuous monitoring for intended as well as unintended outcomes of project engagement and which feedback, in real time, to project managers. IOM should also manage expectations by informing donors and stakeholders of inherent and emerging project risk as well as advocating for sufficient resources to achieve programme objectives.



Staff and mission risk

43. Violent extremists “routinely disregard”²³ the traditional protections afforded to humanitarian action in conflict zones. In 2018, 405 aid workers were killed, injured or kidnapped,²⁴ though not all incidents were perpetrated by violent extremists, their tactics and influence are contributing factors to the risky environment that aid workers encounter. Voices within the humanitarian community have expressed concern that linking humanitarian actors to security aims weakens their claim to impartiality and may put them in harm’s way. Although not the case for IOM, some actors consider PVE programmes as part of a broader *security agenda*.
44. These risks and measures to reduce them must be carefully assessed by mission leadership and at the project level, reflected in a robust Risk Assessment Plan for each project proposal, addressing PVE specific political, security and social risks. In addition to strict compliance with all IOM security policies and procedures, missions with a PVE portfolio may request UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) facilitate periodic dialogue among UN agencies with PVE activities to agree on any special measures or security arrangements. From a programming standpoint, missions should avoid activities that carry unacceptable heightened risk, especially those that pit IOM into direct confrontation with violent extremists, such as communications campaigns that contradict or discredit the groups themselves.
45. CoM’s, PM, RTs and RDs Mission should be sensitive also to the political nature of PVE and its implications for IOM’s relationships with donors, host governments and other partners. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism has cautioned that the breadth and elasticity of the extremism concept opens the door to abuse with reports of its application against non-violent groups, religious texts, journalists and political opposition. Further, while PVE and CT represent distinct spheres of action, mission leadership should anticipate that some groups may associate IOM’s PVE work to CT or even to the foreign policy of particular states. In this sense, IOM’s credibility and standing with partners may be influenced by conduct that is wholly outside the Organization’s influence.
46. In some cases, IOM may reduce the risks that its programming will be politicized by ensuring that IOM’s activities are geared toward objectively-determined priorities. IOM may lessen the association of its programming with the foreign policy of a particular state by diversifying its donor

²³ United Nations Security Council [UNSC]. (24 December 2015). (A/70/674).

²⁴ The Aid Worker Security Database (AWSDB). Major attacks on aid workers: Summary statistics (2008-2018). Retrieved from <https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary>.



base. Where appropriate, a communication strategy that delineates IOM’s goals and activities may be useful.

Beneficiaries and other participants

47. IOM’s approach will often mobilize grassroots organizations, women’s groups, community leaders and youths into collective preventive action. Beneficiaries and other community actors associated with PVE may be subject to abuse or physical danger by violent extremists or their supporters, they may see their rights subjugated to security aims, and they may suffer alienation in their communities if they are regarded as representing external interests. In some contexts, IOM can mitigate these risks through sensitive communications and implementation, but it is always necessary for IOM to ensure that any communal participation is fully informed and voluntary.

Legal issues related to “material support”

48. Many violent extremist groups are designated terrorist organizations under national legislation and listed on the UN Security Council Sanctions List. In general terms, the designation makes it unlawful to provide an individual or group any material support.

49. Under United States laws, for example, it is a federal crime to provide any tangible or intangible property, service, training, expert advice or personnel to a designated terrorist group or an individual engaged in terrorism. It is clear that the laws can apply to humanitarian assistance if provided to members of a designated group, and it has had a “chilling effect” on humanitarian action in contexts like Somalia.²⁵ US donors have required implementing partners to undertake intensive vetting to ensure its programmes are strictly compliant with material support laws. Although these laws come into play prominently in IOM’s ex-combatant reintegration programs, all missions in countries with terrorist groups should be aware of their sweeping application.

50. In any situation where there is a risk that an IOM activity may be interpreted as providing material support in violation of applicable laws, IOM must obtain approval in writing from the technical officer or other contractually responsible person from the respective donor prior to implementing the activity.

Sensitivities associated to specific activities

Targeting “at risk” individuals or groups

51. Measures that target individuals or groups on their basis of their susceptibility to violent extremism can be stigmatizing or isolating. From a protection standpoint, the UN Office of the

²⁵ See Justin A. Fraterman, “Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief: Are US Material Support Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law?” *International Law and Politics*, 46 (NYU, 2014).



High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that efforts to detect and react to very early signs of radicalization may infringe on human rights.²⁶ In addition to avoiding PVE labels, missions may consider community-based approaches that avert the damaging effects of individual targeting. Others including the OSCE have suggested approaching prevention and referral processes from a public health stance rather than as a security intervention.²⁷

Counter narratives

52. Confrontational narratives to refute violent extremists and their efforts, for example by calling attention to corruption, hypocrisy and cruelty, can be problematic. Engaging in a “battle of ideas” with violent extremists can expose those involved to abuse or danger.²⁸ IOM may opt instead to support positive narratives, or authentic and innovative communication strategies that address underlying issues of concern for vulnerable communities. However, IOM should be aware that their effectiveness may depend on tackling real grievances or giving voice to criticism of host governments. Mission leadership should consider whether IOM is the right partner for such initiatives, in view of its status as an intergovernmental organization.

Aiming to change beliefs

53. PVE interventions that target religious beliefs can interfere with fundamental freedoms, stigmatize whole religions and their believers, and, especially where these efforts are linked to Western governments, play into violent extremist narratives of oppression or foreign meddling. From a project risk standpoint, there are serious measurement challenges and questions as to the underlying logic: many recruits into violent extremism did not have radical views at the time of recruitment, and the vast majority of individuals with radical beliefs never turn to violence.²⁹ In short, “[t]here is no linear path from the adoption of certain religious beliefs to the acceptance of, or willingness to use, terrorist violence.”³⁰

Former associates of violent extremist groups

54. *Prior to consideration of any programming related to former associates of designated terrorist groups (foreign fighters, family members or other associates) guidance should be sought from*

²⁶ Human Rights Council Report on Best Practices and Lessons Learned on How Protecting and Promoting Human Rights Contribute to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016 (A/HRC/33/29): 5-6.

²⁷ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], *Understanding referral mechanisms in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism*, (OSCE, 2019).

²⁸ Moreover, messaging that reacts to – or “fires back” at – extremist narratives is not well supported by the evidence. See Kate Ferguson, “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies,” Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, 2016, <http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf>.

²⁹ Alex P. Schmid, “The End of Radicalisation?” (The Hague: ICCT, 2013).

³⁰ OSCE, “Guidelines,” 63.



headquarters via the Transition and Recovery Division, Department of Operations and Emergencies.

55. As these programmes work with individuals who have already been associated, rightly or wrongly, with sanctioned groups, *these reintegration support efforts are not, strictly speaking, PVE projects*, though they may contribute to preventive aims, particularly to the risk of recidivism, and include PVE activities. IOM has been approached by Member States to apply its long-standing expertise in ex-combatant reintegration to the disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of former associates of violent extremist groups. The specifics of these types of program interventions will be addressed in separate guidance and in all cases guidance should be sought from IOM HQ's Transition and Recovery Division.
56. These have included “foreign terrorist fighters” and their families. The UN Security Council defined foreign terrorist fighters as “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.”³¹
57. Host governments have requested IOM support to build national capacities to handle this caseload and family members, many of whom are women. Missions should note that women associated with violent extremism in conflict zones are a heterogenous group with divergent motivations and roles.³² While some governments may assume that returning women are solely victims or classify them as “low risk,” based on their sex, IOM should be aware that the risks set out here, including the possibility that IOM's assistance qualify as unlawful material support, are relevant to women associated with violent extremist group.
58. Generally, while DDR tools and methods can be usefully adapted to violent extremism contexts, doing so raises particular challenges and risks.³³
- More often than not, such DDR will take place in the “shadow of ongoing military operations,” including against the very groups that DDR aspires to demobilize.³⁴

³¹ S/RES/2178 (2014), para. 6.

³² Joana Cook and Gina Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State,” (London: ICSR, 2018), 26-28; OSCE, “Guidelines,” 64-67.

³³ James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil, eds., *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?* (United Nations University, 2015).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.



- Former associates, who may include children, may be subjected to arbitrary detention or inhumane treatment by security forces. The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy governs UN support to security forces where there is a real risk of grave violations of international law.³⁵
 - While traditional DDR presupposes voluntary participation, former violent extremists often come to the programmes after military capture or under duress, which may amount to detention with added layers of legal, operational and ethical challenges.³⁶
 - DDR programmes for violent extremists often feature a deradicalization component as part of the rehabilitation process. Unlike disengagement efforts that seek a change in behavior, deradicalization aims for cognitive transformation. Combined with potentially involuntary participation, these interventions may interfere with fundamental freedoms of thought and religion.
59. Note also that even where an individual has disengaged from a violent extremist group, laws against providing them with material support generally remain applicable without an express revocation of status, delisting, waiver or other legal change or formal exception.
60. Concerning children, IOM should recall that pursuant to international human rights law, individuals under the age of 18 are legally incapable of consenting to recruitment, meaning that their participation in an armed group is necessarily forced. Children associated with armed groups are first and foremost victims. While this status does not mean that older children can never be held responsible for their crimes, it does require all parties to advance the best interest of the child, provide support for recovery and social reintegration and use criminal justice measures only as a last resort.³⁷ Given UNICEF's mandate on child protection and extensive experience assisting child soldiers, IOM should closely coordinate with UNICEF on issues concerning children associated with violent extremism. Given the sensitivities of these cases, guidance should be sought from IOM HQ's Transition and Recovery Division.

VI. PVE considerations within the IOM project cycle

61. To facilitate the application of this Note to the ongoing work of missions, this section situates guidance for responsible and effective PVE programming within the project cycle set out in the IOM Project Handbook.

³⁵ Ibid., 151-2.

³⁶ Bruce Oswald, "DDR and Detention in UN Peace Operations," in *UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose?* (United Nations University, 2015), 80-103.

³⁷ OSCE, "Guidelines," 68-72.



Conceptualization

The project idea

62. Although PVE proposals are often prepared in response to donor and host country requests, IOM can secure more independence to frame the issues and design interventions by proactively conceptualizing PVE projects. Missions may seek technical support during this creative process from their regional office, HQ or other missions with established PVE portfolios. Because of the sensitivities related to this type of programming, the approval of Concept Notes and final endorsement of all PVE-related projects rests with IOM's HQ's Transition and Recovery Division (TRD). Early engagement with TRD is therefore recommended to avoid problems in the project development process.

IOM capacity

63. At this stage in the project cycle, mission management should determine whether existing capacities should be reinforced through short-term assignments from headquarters or other missions, new recruitment, staff training or joint programming arrangements with international or local partners.

IOM strategic focus and principles

64. Where IOM is responding to a donor or host government request, mission management should determine whether the request can be aligned with the principles and minimum standards for endorsement set out in this Note. An important determination is whether the proposed strategy could "be too sensitive for IOM as an intergovernmental organization."

Assessing evidence, research

65. The complex and political nature of PVE counsels against relying on research findings from a single source. Absent reliable evidence, IOM should undertake independent research to ensure that the problem to be addressed is defined objectively. Researchers may adopt the structural-individual-enabling factor classification set out in *RUSI's Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction Guide*³⁸ or a similar framework to ensure that all factors are considered. Researchers should look beyond simple correlations to ascertain causal relationships among variables and violent extremism.³⁹ Where research is included as a first step in a larger project, IOM should negotiate for flexibility to revise the larger project based on research findings.

³⁸ Khalil and Zeuthen, "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction," 10-11.

³⁹ A correlation between one variable, say poverty, and violent extremism is insufficient grounds for programming decisions because the correlation is consistent with a number of alternate relationships: Poverty may cause violent extremism; violent extremism may cause poverty; both may be caused by a third variable, such as armed conflict; or any combination of these relationships may be at play. See Khalil and Zeuthen, "Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction," 14-15.



Risk analysis

66. In the Project Handbook, risk awareness starts in the conceptualization phase with a factor analysis, but rigorous risk evaluation and planning are developed in subsequent phases. For PVE programming, project management should ensure that comprehensive analysis of risks and mitigating measures is completed prior to project endorsement. *See Section II of this document and pages 271-5 of the IOM Project Handbook.*

Donor liaison and fundraising

67. As IOM explores fundraising options during the conceptualization phase, it is advisable to pursue resources from multiple donors. A diversified donor base can lessen the association of IOM's work with a particular foreign policy agenda and enable mission management to comply with restrictions some donors put on PVE, without sacrificing a holistic process.

68. Starting as early as possible, IOM should stress the core principles that shape IOM's PVE approach and negotiate for the following features to be reflected in the donor agreement:

- **Research:** Substantial resources should be set aside for start-up research and continual situational analysis to assess changed circumstances.
- **Terminology:** Where donors are inclined to use terminology that risks complicating programming or stigmatizing participants, IOM should negotiate for appropriate language. *See Section I.* In all events, IOM must avoid linking its PVE work to CT.
- **Timeframes:** IOM should clarify that too-short durations can do harm to beneficiaries and other participants and carry a high risk of project failure. This is particularly important for project activities that seek to transform structural factors or intervene in grassroots dynamics, for example, by empowering women's groups or youths.
- **Budget:** In securing adequate resources for PVE programming, IOM should note how certain PVE requirements impact on cost. For example, research and M&E components will require new baselines and qualitative methods, such as focus groups and key informant interviews, which can be costly. Monitoring in fragile contexts is often carried out by third-party monitors, which also requires significant funds. Likewise, costs may run high to recruit staff with the needed technical and political skills.
- **Adaptability, flexibility and learning:** Violent extremist contexts are not static, and IOM should negotiate for as much flexibility as possible in the donor agreement and establish regular engagement with donors to maximize their buy-in and openness to flexibility. At a minimum, the agreement should allow for changes to align with the findings from research and establish a joint mechanism for periodic revisions based on situational analysis and strategic monitoring.
- **Donor visibility:** Communicating the donor's involvement may be problematic if it plays into violent extremist narratives or increases the risk of stigmatization to participants. Donors may be open to exceptions to their established visibility requirements. For example, USAID has recognized



that its usual “branding” practices can be counterproductive in a development response to violent extremism.⁴⁰

Proposal development

PVE classification

69. At this stage, developers should determine whether the project is PVE-specific or PVE-relevant, which has implications for project development, endorsement and implementation. As noted already, PVE-specific programming is designed pursuant to a theory of change supported by evidence, while PVE-relevant programming refers to activities that do not meet the definition of PVE-specific programming but that nonetheless are expected to impact positively on PVE aims.

Project title, language

70. In developing a proposal, IOM missions should be sensitive to implications of terminology and keep in mind that proposals can become public. Generally, it is advisable to avoid referencing violent extremism in the project title.

Results framework

71. Typically, the *objectives* of PVE-specific projects relate to a decline in violence or recruitment, decreased support for violent extremism or increased resilience. Indicators at the objective level are worthwhile, but their usefulness for measuring IOM’s performance is limited by the difficulties in attributing high-level change to a particular intervention and by the preclusion of open questioning on violent extremism in many contexts.

- **Violence:** Project developers may devise a time- and location-bound indicator on the number of violent incidents and additional measures of the impact of violence, for example, the number of persons newly displaced.
- **Recruitment and support to violent extremism:** Communities may have local mechanisms to track recruitment and it may be possible to discuss developments with key informants.
- **Resilience:** Possible indicators for resilience or susceptibility to violent extremism include attitudes toward violence, such as a belief that violence is “sometimes necessary” or “an effective way to achieve goals,” and reported instances of violence for dispute resolution or political causes.⁴¹ Increases in community participation in community events as a proxy indicator for increased community cohesion and other qualitative indicators of public perceptions should also be considered.

⁴⁰ USAID, “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency,” (2015), 12. .

⁴¹ See AfP, Peacebuilding Approaches, 6.



72. *Outcomes* of PVE-specific projects often reflect intended changes to the identified drivers of violent extremism or in the performance of government and other stakeholders. At this level, IOM should supplement traditional indicators that measure changes in the social, economic or political status of beneficiaries with indicators that capture questions of identity, perceptions and group dynamics. Examples include: willingness to socialize with someone from an “opposing” group, identification as a citizen, intention to vote, claims of unfair treatment, and perceptions on government responsiveness and legitimacy.

Theory of change

73. In addition to the results matrix set out in the Project Handbook, PVE-specific proposals must contain a theory of change (TOC), understood as a “comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context.”⁴² The TOC requires a clear understanding of the causal connections among results to trace a coherent path from the activities to the desired objectives, and particularly an explanation of underlying assumption on which this is based.⁴³ These assumptions can then be tested throughout project implementation and adjustments made accordingly.

Project endorsement, submission, and activation

74. The endorsement instruction set out by the Director General in August 2015 remains valid at this time: All Counter Terrorism related proposals, such as those related to border management or support for the production of advanced passenger manifest information, should be copied to DMM’s Immigration and Border Management Division and PVE-related proposals should be reviewed at the Mission, RO and HQ levels, with final endorsement through DOE’s Transition and Recovery Division (TRD). For projects within TRD’s purview, proposals must first be reviewed and pre-approved by the Mission before being forwarded to the respective DOE regional technical specialist with attention to the following requirements:

All PVE proposals must:

- Illustrate a purposeful and sensitive approach to terminology around violent extremism and violent radicalization.
- Avoid language or content that suggests a link between violent extremism and religion or ethnicity.
- Avoid simplistic and unfounded statements on potential intersections between migration and violent extremism.
- Exclude any participation in or support to activities that run counter to international human rights law or IHL, including fundamental freedoms to thought, expression and religion.

⁴² Center for Theory of Change at <https://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-of-change/>.

⁴³ For examples of common theories of change in PVE, see AfP, “Peacebuilding Approaches,” 7-12.



- Provide a detailed discussion that identifies risks and mitigating measures, including any applicable risks set out in Section II to the project, staff and mission (for example, safety, political instrumentalization and reputational concerns), beneficiaries and participants (for example, stigmatization), as well as risks associated with specific activities or former violent extremists. This discussion on risk may be incorporated in the proposal or submitted separately in line with the Project Handbook guidance on point.
- Include adequate financial resources for PVE staffing, monitoring for quality assurance and impact, and final evaluation.

PVE-specific proposals must additionally:

- Articulate a TOC that gives illustrates why and how the proposed intervention leads to the desired objectives with special attention to identifying underlying assumptions.
- Identify existing evidence for the TOC. Where such evidence is not available or comes from a single, uncorroborated source, the proposal must include and budget for new research.
- Address gendered aspects and implications of the project.

From project management to evaluation

75. While this Note is focused on conceptualization, development and launch of PVE initiatives, covered in the first three phases of the IOM Project Handbook, this final section anticipates selected issues that may emerge during implementation.

Communications

76. As evident in the discussions above, PVE requires a cautious use of terminology and clear messaging to avoid stigmatization or discriminatory associations between violent extremism and religious, ethnic or migration status, as well as to distinguish IOM's PVE efforts from counter-terrorism or the foreign policy of particular states. To that end, project management must devise a communications protocol that will apply to all project and staff communications, including terminology to be used or avoided and talking points on the mission and project for different audiences. Note that in very sensitive contexts, IOM's communication strategy may involve minimizing communications and the organization's visibility in relation to the project.

Information and data

77. PVE projects may involve the collection of large amounts of information and data, for example, during initial research and ongoing analysis, monitoring and evaluation. Management should establish project-specific guidance on information and data management prior to implementation



roll-out. This guidance should reflect IOM’s commitment to taking “all reasonable and necessary precautions to preserve the confidentiality of personal data and the anonymity of data subjects.”⁴⁴

78. In some PVE contexts, it may be especially relevant to recall that IOM data protection principles also govern the transfer of personal data to third parties by requiring explicit consent of the subject, for a specified purpose, and guarantees of adequate safeguards to protect confidentiality and ensure the rights and interests of the subject.⁴⁵
79. More generally, all information acquired by IOM should be handled with conflict sensitivity, including measures to prevent others from misinterpreting or intentionally misusing IOM-generated information in ways that do harm.

Staff selection and training

80. Project management should be aware of any existing social tensions and group divisions in the targeted communities and consider how IOM’s staff composition could interact with those dynamics. Regarding staff training, even if the technical content of proposed activities is familiar to IOM staff, there are PVE-related skills that may need reinforcement, such as quantitative and qualitative methods, conflict and political sensitivity, security and risk management, protection of data and information, and adaptive decision-making, maintenance of confidentiality and managing communication in a sensitive manner.
81. Recognizing that all staff represent and communicate the project to different audiences, all staff should be prepared to discuss the project in accordance with mission-established guidelines. For those directly involved in the project, staff should be prepared to discuss in detail and present key messages according to the project’s communication protocol. To that end, management should provide staff with relevant training, coaching and written resources (for example, a “Q&A cheat sheet”).
82. In addition to the results-focused monitoring described in the Project Handbook, PVE programming should incorporate strategic monitoring to gauge intended and unintended project impacts and significant changes in context. Importantly, mechanisms should be in place that enable management to adjust project goals and plans to align with monitoring findings. As noted already, periodic reviews can be agreed with project donors and stakeholders to jointly consider strategic adjustments during implementation.

⁴⁴ IOM, “Data Protection Manual,” (Geneva: IOM, 2010).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11-12.



Internal coordination

83. The Project Manual's recommendation to missions to share regular projects updates and information on innovations or challenges with the relevant division in headquarters is especially important in the emerging field of PVE. With a view to strengthening coherence, building knowledge and managing risks, missions should share with TRD relevant documents, knowledge and insights, at a minimum including donor reports, public information pieces, research findings and evaluations.

Reporting

84. Because donor reports are often made public by the host government, the donor, IOM or a third party, any mission decisions on how to frame the intervention and appropriate terminology should be reflected in these documents and discussed in advance with the donor.

Evaluation

85. Contributing to a growing evidentiary base, IOM may consider making the results of PVE evaluations available to the public or partners, including in our IATI reporting obligations. Moreover, as some aspects of PVE programming are novel to IOM and others in the international community, IOM may consider facilitating a candid exchange among partners on programme successes and failures.



ANNEX I: Project endorsement requirements

Project endorsement, submission, and activation

The endorsement instruction set out by the Director General in August 2015 remains valid at this time: Projects within TRD's purview, proposals must first be reviewed and pre-approved by the respective regional technical specialist with attention to the principles outlined in this Note (under section V. Parameters for Engagement) before final endorsement by DOE/TRD and must address the following requirements:⁴⁶

All PVE proposals must:

- Illustrate a purposeful and *sensitive approach to terminology* around violent extremism and violent radicalization and avoid the use of 'counter terrorism', 'violent extremism' or 'radicalization' in the project title.⁴⁷
- Avoid language or content that suggests a link between violent extremism and religion or ethnicity.
- Avoid simplistic and unfounded statements on potential intersections between migration and violent extremism.
- Exclude any participation in or support to activities that run counter to international human rights law or IHL, including fundamental freedoms to thought, expression and religion.
- Provide a detailed discussion that identifies risks and mitigating measures, including any applicable risks set out in Section II to the project, staff and mission (for example, safety, political instrumentalization and reputational concerns), beneficiaries and participants (for example, stigmatization), as well as risks associated with specific activities or former violent extremists. This discussion on risk may be incorporated in the proposal or submitted separately in line with the Project Handbook guidance on point.
- Include a visibility plan/strategy that clearly defines how all IOM staff will communicate and represent the project or programme publicly.
- Include adequate financial resources for ongoing research, monitoring and final evaluation.
- Budget adequate funding for an appropriately senior PVE manager.
- It is important that all PVE related projects include a provision for Head Quarters Support and Oversight to be discussed with TRD, to ensure institutional capacity and support.

⁴⁶ All CT related proposals, such as those related to border management or support for the production of advanced passenger manifest information, should be copied to DMM's Immigration and Border Management Division and PVE-related proposals to DOE's Transition and Recovery Division (TRD) for endorsement review.

⁴⁷ Project titles should be drafted with consideration to IOM's commitment to International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) publication of projects.



International Organization for Migration (IOM)
The UN Migration Agency

PVE-specific proposals must additionally:

- Articulate a TOC that gives illustrates why and how the proposed intervention leads to the desired objectives.
- Identify existing evidence for the TOC. Where such evidence is not available or comes from a single, uncorroborated source, the proposal must include and budget for new research.
- Address gendered aspects and implications of the project.